Many times, McCarthy has spoken glowingly of Sanders as a strategist and as a person since he hired him - sight unseen - off the outgoing staff of Mike Sherman. Thompson appears to hold Sanders in high regard as well.

But all of that will mean nothing if the Green Bay Packers' season continues to spiral out of control and the decision-makers determine that Sanders isn't the man they still want running their defense.

Three weeks ago, the Packers allowed 51 points in New Orleans, their highest yield in 22 years.

Two weeks ago, the Packers gave up five 1-yard touchdown runs against Carolina, some of them without even a fight.

And then last week the Packers surrendered 549 yards to Houston, a total not witnessed against Green Bay in 25 years.

A defense that was ranked 12th in points and 16th in yards after 10 games now finds itself ranked 22nd and 23rd.

As calculating as McCarthy and Thompson are, the last three games probably won't carry more weight than Sanders' 44 others. They will measure the man and his entire body of work, and then make a decision that will help shape their own futures.

It's hard to say what they're going to do. The guess would be Sanders will return, but if his unit continues to falter against the mediocre to poor offenses of Jacksonville, Chicago and Detroit then the other shoe might fall.

The sum of 45 regular-season games should serve to minimize the variables of personnel, injury and circumstance in assessing a coordinator. The statistical portrait of Sanders, drawn against the other 31 teams in the National Football League, indicates a coordinator doing an average job.

In those 45 games, Sanders' defense has allowed 325.5 yards per game compared to the NFL average of 324.1, 21.7 points compared to the NFL average of 21.5 and 118 rushing yards compared to the NFL average of 113.9.

Since 2006, Green Bay has 103 sacks, above the NFL average of 97.5; 60 interceptions, above the NFL average of 45; and 25 recovered fumbles, below the NFL average of 32.1.

But the bare bones of statistics and the furor stemming from the last three games tend to obscure the most compelling reasons in the debate on Sanders.

From my standpoint, the case against Sanders starts with the predictability of his scheme, which could be summarized as a 4-3 "over" front with a heavy emphasis on Cover 1 coverage (man-to-man) and a smattering of zone, both Cover 4 ("quarters") and Cover 3 (three across).

Generally speaking, Sanders learned this defense from coach Dave Wannstedt and coordinator Jim Bates, who were his bosses with the Miami Dolphins from 2001-'04. Wannstedt brought it to Miami after having learned it from Jimmy Johnson, who won a pair of Super Bowls with it in Dallas.

"When you talk to people around the NFL, it was always that we did less than most teams but we did it better," Wannstedt said in an interview in January 2005. "Our philosophy always was that we know the system better and will execute it better than your offensive plays. We tried to keep it simple and let the players play."

The Cowboys didn't have great cornerbacks so they played the four-across or "quarters" system. When Wannstedt was in Miami, the Dolphins played press man-to-man because cornerbacks Sam Madison and Patrick Surtain were so talented.

"You can't blitz without corners," said Wannstedt. "Everyone knows that. My nature never was to be a big blitz guy. Our mental mistakes were minimal. That was always a focus."

In "quarters," the safeties line up shallow at about 9 yards and the cornerbacks usually play off. When played efficiently, "quarters" stops the run because both safeties are close to the line and it prevents the big play, forcing opponents into long drives.

Because of Al Harris and Charles Woodson, Sanders plays almost strictly Cover 1.

"When they're healthy, they play man-to-man as good as anybody in the league," said an offensive assistant for a team that played Green Bay in the last three weeks.

McCarthy has said he loves this style of defense because it "chokes" the opponent. And, against below-average quarterbacks and wide receivers, it often has.

But the Packers also have been burned by a series of routes designed to beat man-to-man coverage, such as crossing patterns with or without motion, stutter-and-go routes inside and double moves outside. McCarthy and Thompson undoubtedly haven't forgotten the NFC Championship Game, when the Giants' Plaxico Burress ate up Harris' bump-and-run coverage and Sanders failed to adjust.

Unlike most coaches in the NFL, Sanders isn't big on disguising coverages. He will drop either safety down before the snap, but other than that teams pretty much know what they're going to get.

When teams are running well, Sanders will react with a run-blitz in which Brady Poppinga crashes into the backfield and the middle linebacker cleans up behind him. His run-stopping fronts include a "bear" with linemen covering the center and both guards, and a 6-1 "saw fire" in which the Packers send a linebacker off each corner.

Sanders is becoming even more conservative when it comes to sending extra pass rushers. He blitzed five or more on 24.5% of passes in 2006, but then just 21.8% in 2007 and 20.5% so far this year.

With Cullen Jenkins disrupting passers in the first month, Sanders blitzed merely 17.7%. But even though the Packers' pass rush has been lousy since Jenkins' season-ending chest injury, Sanders has blitzed just 21.9% in the last nine games.

"It's not a long list of blitzes that you have to prepare for," an offensive assistant for another recent Packers foe said. "There wasn't any one blitz you had to spend time game-planning or any blitz that you had to get out of a formation because they've gotten free runners at quarterbacks.

"There was no overload blitz or blitz to a personnel group that we felt was going to take us out of what we wanted to do. So now it's a matter of pretty simple execution."

When Sanders does blitz, it's fairly simplistic stuff using linebackers. In 13 games, he has blitzed a cornerback 14 times and a safety nine times. Nick Collins has blitzed twice.

Sanders also almost never zone blitzes, in which a defensive lineman drops into coverage and is replaced by others to make a five-man rush. The Packers have run 11 zone blitzes all season, down from 27 in 2007 and 20 in 2006. Coordinator Ed Donatell zone-blitzed 103 times in 2003.

How many teams have a more voluminous and complex blitz package than Green Bay?

"At least half," said the coach, who has been in the NFL for more than a decade. "He would be in the minority of guys that don't employ any of that type thing. Not that there's anything wrong with it, but we didn't have to worry about it."

The case for Sanders would be his years of experience coaching a system that aggressively attacks the passing game.

Sanders is as loyal as the day is long. He listens extremely well to players, which they appreciate immensely. He is an even-keeled, rational, responsible individual.

Modest to a fault, Sanders defends his players. At least publicly, they can do no wrong. As a result, they appear to like and respect him.

Sanders has coordinated in Green Bay when he had no injuries (one starter for one game) in 2006, some injuries (three starters, five games) in 2007 and a lot of injuries (four starters, 24 games) this year. It all evens out.

Only nine of the current 32 coordinators have been in their jobs for at least five straight years, partially because turnover in the coordinator ranks happens more and more. In Green Bay, Bart Starr fired Dave Hanner in December 1979, Mike Sherman fired Donatell in December 2003 and Sherman effectively fired Bob Slowik in January 2005.

Forrest Gregg fired some coaches in the mid-1980s. Lindy Infante didn't fire anyone in his four years, and neither did Mike Holmgren in his seven years. One of Holmgren's pupils, Andy Reid, hasn't fired a coach during his decade in Philadelphia, but longtime Denver Broncos coach Mike Shanahan has let many coaches go.

Just because McCarthy hasn't fired a coach yet doesn't mean he won't now even if it also would reflect poorly on him. Because Sanders is such a decent human being, firing him undoubtedly would be doubly hard.

Maybe the defense needs someone to change what appears to be a very comfortable environment and kick some butt. That's the type of coach that Jim Haslett is, and he probably won't be retained in St. Louis. One of McCarthy's former bosses, Mike Nolan, already is available.

There are a host of other defensive coaches with pedigree who could come free, including Gregg Williams, Ron Rivera, Rob Ryan, Wade Phillips, Romeo Crennel, Marvin Lewis, Dave McGinnis, Gunther Cunningham, Mike Zimmer, Herm Edwards and Rod Marinelli, to name a few.

And then there's Winston Moss, McCarthy's assistant head coach since 2007 and his linebackers coach since '06. Moss wants to be a coordinator, and if he was passed over it's logical to assume that he would leave for another job.

Most Football people would say that Pittsburgh's Dick LeBeau, Tampa Bay's Monte Kiffin and Philadelphia's Jim Johnson are the finest coordinators in the business. Their ages are 71, 68 and 67.

No one would put Sanders in that class, but he is competent, diligent and a class act. If McCarthy thought Sanders could make significant changes, he might ask him to do so. Then Sanders would have a decision to make of his own.

For now, the call must be made by McCarthy and Thompson.

Do they strike out to find the next great coordinator? Or do they strike a blow for continuity and come back in 2009 with Sanders?

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